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Background: The aim of this paper is to compare common features and variation in the work of research ethics
committees (RECs) in Finland to three other countries – England, Canada, the United States of America (USA) – in
the late 2000s.
Methods: Several approaches and data sources were used, including semi- or unstructured interviews of experts,
documents, previous reports, presentations in meetings and observations. A theoretical framework was created and
data from various sources synthesized.
Results: In Finland, RECs were regulated by a medical research law, whereas in the other countries many related
laws and rules guided RECs; drug trials had specific additional rules. In England and the USA, there was a REC
control body. In all countries, members were voluntary and included lay-persons, and payment arrangements
varied. Patient protection was the main ethics criteria, but other criteria (research advancement, availability of
results, payments, detailed fulfilment of legislation) varied. In all countries, RECs had been given administrative
duties. Variations by country included the mandate, practical arrangements, handling of multi-site research,
explicitness of proportionate handlings, judging scientific quality, time-limits for decisions, following of projects,
role in institute protection, handling conflicts of interests, handling of projects without informed consent, and
quality assurance research. The division of work between REC members and secretariats varied in checking of
formalities. In England, quality assurance of REC work was thorough, fairly thorough in the USA, and not
performed in Finland.
Conclusions: The work of RECs in the four countries varied notably. Various deficiencies in the system require
action, for which international comparison can provide useful insights.
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Background
Review by research ethics committees (RECs), also called
research ethics boards or institutional review boards, has
become the key in clinical research regulation [1-4]. In the
European Union (EU), the 2001 Clinical Trial Directive,
which required the establishment of ethics committees to
review drug trials, was an important stimulus for the
appearance of such bodies. As part of a larger study on
clinical research regulation, the work of RECs in Finland
was compared to three other countries: England, Canada,
and the United States of America (USA) [4]. This paper
aims to compare common features and variation in the
work of RECs in the late 2000s, concentrating on the main
REC system. The comparison of REC structures and the
study context have been previously published [4], and are
only briefly summarized below.
There is much previous literature on the work of RECs
in individual countries and their specific aspects; anec-
dotal stories and expert views have also been published.
Comparative data on decisions and the quality of REC
work are scarce, but studies show that countries vary in
terms of the structural features of their RECs [1,5-14].
In Finland, RECs are area-based and have a monopoly,
handling all medical research (as defined by law) in their
area. Only a small and regulated number of RECs deal
with clinical research (21 (five since 2010) and a central
committee); there are no private RECs. In England, since
2004, the number of RECs has been regulated, declining
from around 200 in 2002 to around 80 in 2010 (69 in
2013). England’s few private RECs were amalgamated
with the NHS system by 2013. In Canada, RECs are
health facility (hospital)-based, substance-based, or pri-
vate, can be freely established, and are numerous. Like-
wise, the USA has a large number of RECs (around
4,500), and several RECs can be located within one insti-
tute or hospital. Private committees play a bigger role,
being large in size but small in number (around 30). All
four countries have RECs other than those described
above, which handle health research beyond the mandate
of the main REC system.
Methods
The methods used herein have been described in detail
in previous papers [4,15,16], and briefly summarized
below. Several approaches and data sources were used.
The key method applied consisted of semi-structured
and unstructured interviews of experts. In addition, use
was made of previous reports, documents, meeting pre-
sentations, informal discussions with experts and obser-
vations. Empirical data was systematically collected: in
Finland in 2009–2011, in Canada in late 2010, in England
in early 2011, and in the USA in late 2011. Some data was
completed up to spring 2014 using web pages, publica-
tions and later interviews.
In Finland, 26 experts involved in research and health
services were purposefully selected and interviewed, as
were 22 chairpersons from 25 official medical RECs. In
the other countries, interviewees were chosen based on
previous knowledge of institutes important in this con-
text, suggestions made by the interviewees, geograph-
ical proximity, and availability during data collection
visits. The numbers of interviewed experts were: 21 in
England, 13 in Canada (Ontario), and 24 in the USA. In
spring 2014, a draft report was shown to two experts in
Canada, England, and the USA and was modified based
on their comments.
Most interviews were semi-structured, but some were
unstructured and resembled normal discussions. The
themes of the interviews and some pre-prepared ques-
tions were drawn up prior to each interview, but the ac-
tual interview and its focus varied in accordance with
the expert’s position, experience and emergent informa-
tion. Information and material from previous interviews
were utilized in subsequent interviews. In Finland, the
original questions and themes were chosen by previous
literature and the project researchers’ knowledge and ex-
perience of research regulation; the questions were
reformulated when new information from the interviews
accumulated. In the other countries, the interviewees
were approached with an open mind. Data collection
was a learning process: the questions and items were
first formulated by the Finnish experience and prior
reading, and reformulated in subsequent interviews by
new information.
The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to 3 hours.
They were not tape-recorded, but notes were made and
a summary of the interview was drawn up afterwards. In
each country, documents were collected from the web
pages of the institutions involved, or were handed over
during the interviews. The relevant publications were
sought from literature databases and from references
given during the interviews.
For the analysis, a theoretical framework was cre-
ated comprising the dimensions of REC structures
and work. The analysis was material based (grounded
theory). During data collection, preliminary classes of
items were raised and noted. After the data were col-
lected, empty tables, organized by dimension each
containing many items, were created. The tables were
initially filled, as recalled from the data collection.
Then, country-specific interview notes and documents
were iteratively read by one researcher; notes were
made on various topics and dimensions using self-
adhesive notes, and organized by topic/dimension and
by country. The framework was modified and made
more detailed during note making. Data from various
sources was synthesized and the features of the sys-
tems were simplified and classified. If an item was an
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unequivocal fact and not found in the original country-
specific notes, documents and web-pages were searched
for it.
Different terms, varying between the interviewees and
documents, were used in each country. Specific names
and terms were changed into general ones [4]. Clinical
research refers to research conducted on and with
patients; clinical trial refers to research that evaluates in-
terventions using experimental methods (not restricted
to drugs).
A positive statement was issued by the THL ethics com-
mittee on the project as a whole (MERGO Ethical review
and administrative governance of clinical research; June
17, 2010, amendment Jan 27, 2011). All interviews were
voluntary; the interviewees understood the purpose of the
interviews and were interviewed as experts. The docu-
ments used were public.
Results
Legal and ethical basis
In Finland, the law-based RECs held a monopoly on
reviewing all “medical research” (Table 1), but could re-
view other types of research by choice. The definition of
medical research was narrow: “research, in which the in-
tegrity of a human or her embryo or fetus is subject to
intervention or the causes, symptoms, diagnostics, care,
prevention or general features of diseases, (since 2010)
and which aims to increase knowledge on health”, leaving
out much health and healthcare research. Until 2008, in
England, all research within the NHS, all research with
NHS patients since then, and some specific types of re-
search defined by various laws, were to be handled by
NHS RECs. In Canada and the USA, RECs covered
human research broadly, but different types of research
projects were often handled by different RECs. The
definition of human research was restricted to identifiable
private information and living humans.
In each country, there were many rules and guidelines,
which RECs should or could use to guide their work.
These are described in simplified format in Table 1 and
Additional file 1. In Finland, RECs had been regulated
since 1999 by a medical research law and its sub-laws,
specifying REC mandates and tasks. In the other coun-
tries, RECs were less directly law based, but referred to
by various laws. In England, RECs were specified by
health ministry rules, including those of the REC control
body (National Research Ethics Service (NRES); in 2012,
it became part of the Health Research Authority). Al-
though RECs were not legal bodies in general, they were
in regard to drug and device trials and some special clas-
ses, such as research with persons lacking the capacity
to consent and exposure to ionizing radiation, as stipu-
lated in specific laws. In Canada, RECs were formalized
by the requirements and guidelines of the main public
funder, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, part
of the Tri-Council funding agency. In the USA, the re-
search law (1974 National Research Act) mentioned the
need for REC review and informed consent. REC tasks
were expanded in government (federal) regulations
(Common rule). The Common rule concerned all hu-
man research, but was adaptable to the research type
and purpose.
In each country, laws on data confidentiality (privacy
laws/freedom of information laws) existed and were
integral to research regulation. Detailed information
on these intricate regulations was not collected,
and the role of the RECs overseeing them varied.
Additional special laws governed drug trials in all of
the countries [4].
Research ethics codes, such as the Declaration of
Helsinki [1], were not central to discussions on the REC
Table 1 Rules regulating research ethics committees (RECs) and their work in clinical research, Finland compared to England,
Canada (Ontario), and the USA, around 2010
Finland England Canada USA
Type of research handled Medical Within NHS; specific typesa Human and health care Human and health care
Specific research law Yes, medical research No No Yes, general
Main basis Law Health Ministry rules Requirements from
national grant agency
Government rules
Special law for drug trials EU clinical trials directive,
national laws
EU clinical trials directive,
national laws
Drug and devices law Drug, devices and food law
Leading document No single No single Tri-Council statementb Common rule
Helsinki declaration Separate document Separate document Some parts integrated
in leading document
Some parts integrated in
leading document
International Committee on








aRegardless of place, a certain type of research, such as investigational drugs and devices, adults lacking capacity to consent, exposure to ionizing radiation.
bTri-Council statements, tri-council policy statement: ethical conduct for research involving humans.
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system or work. However, codes had had an impact on
national guideline formulation.
REC members and processes
Members
In Finland, expertise in research ethics, law, medicine,
nursing sciences (since 2010) – and at least two lay-
members – were required (Table 2). In England, a varied
composition was required, with one third of the members
being lay-persons. In Canada, the required expertise was
defined as multidisciplinary and independent: at least five
members, both men and women, of whom at least two
were experts in the research area, one in ethics, one in the
relevant law, and one community representative. In the
USA, the regulations defined the minimum number of
members (five), at least one of whom was to be unaffili-
ated with the institution. Membership should be diverse
(by race, gender, cultural background, sensitivity to com-
munity issues), with at least one scientist and one non-
scientist. In all countries, REC membership was voluntary.
Payment arrangements varied by REC and country;
furthermore, the employers of REC members decided on
whether work could be done during working hours. In
Finland, meeting costs were usually covered (Table 2). In
some committees, the chairperson and the member
presenting the application were paid a lump sum. In
England, members and chairpersons were unpaid, but
locum (cover for members during REC meetings) and
travel costs could be covered. In Canada, REC chair-
persons were usually paid, but members were not.
Some REC chairs were professional and paid for their
weekly time. In the USA, institutional members could
count REC work as part of their share of outside
funding. Private committee members were paid.
Multi-centre project handling
In Finland, the research law’s amendment in 2010 was
explicit to only a single handling. The central REC was
the primary address for multi-centre drug trials, but
most applications were delegated to local RECs. In
England, the EU clinical trials directive contributed
to the creation of a system in which multi-centre
projects were reviewed by one REC only. In Canada
(Ontario), several proposals had been made to centralize
REC work for multi-centre projects, but this had occurred
in only a few areas, such as cancer trials. In the USA,
multi-centre projects could be handled in three ways: in
each local committee, one committee being chosen to re-
view on behalf of all, or an outsider ethics committee be-
ing chosen to conduct a single review. Even though the
problems associated with multi-handling were obvious,
various factors favoured decentralized handling. They in-
cluded close collaboration between RECs, the decision
maker and the research contract office, liability issues and
hospital insurers’ requirements.
Time-limits for decisions
In Finland and England, the EU clinical trials directive
set limits on review times and tabling for drug trials
(Table 2), but did not apply to other types of research.
In Canada and the USA, there were no rules on how
quickly a REC should make decisions or the number of
times it could table an application. In all countries,
researchers and sponsors expected rapid handling and
clear reasons for tabling; anecdotal information suggested
that many researchers were dissatisfied with these aspects.
Presence of researchers
In Finland, researchers were seldom present in REC meet-
ings to answer questions, in England this was standard
Table 2 Members and processes of research ethics committees (RECs), Finland compared to England, Canada (Ontario), and the
USA, around 2010
Finland England Canada USAa
REC members
Expertise Specified some expertise “Many-sided” Specified some expertise “Many-sided”
Lay-members, at least Two One third One One
Voluntary Yes Yes Yes Yes





Multi-centre project One committee One committee Usually several Various options,
usually several
Time-limit for decisions 3 months for drug trials 2 months for drug trials No No
Proportionate review Not explicitly Yes, leading principle Yes Yes, leading principle
Help researchers in submission Most RECs Yes Yes Yes
Application formalities Also members Secretariat mainly Secretariat mainly Secretariat mainly
aPrivate RECs different.
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practice, but in Canada (Ontario) it was rare. No informa-
tion was available for the USA.
Proportionate review (different handling based on assumed
risk to study participants)
In Finland, proportionate review was not explicit (Table 2).
In England, proportionate review was pushed by higher
level research regulators. In Canada and the USA (the terms
‘expedited review’ and ‘fast tracking’ were used) proportion-
ate review was explicit. The division into ordinary and expe-
dited reviews was usually proposed by the researchers and
preliminarily determined by the REC secretariat.
Checking formalities
In all countries, REC secretariats often helped researchers
to prepare the application. However, in Finland, the secre-
tariats were modest in size and technical capacity, redu-
cing the help they could offer (Table 2). REC secretariats
were mainly responsible for ensuring that the applications
fulfilled the various detailed rules, but REC members also
performed much of this work. Among REC members, a
common complaint was that ethics are buried under tech-
nical details. In England, the REC control body (NRES)
had successfully lightened the administrative burden, in-
cluding the introduction of a standard electronic portal
for applications. In Canada, technical assistants for paper-
work were commonly organized into ethics and contract
offices. Applications were constructed based on standard
forms, but REC members and researchers still complained
about spending too much time following rules. In the
USA, the application forms were detailed and institutions
had created various well-resourced offices to lessen the
REC’s work.
Costs
Institutions’ regulatory costs associated with RECs were
mentioned in expert interviews only in the USA, being
considered an important risk management element.
Regulatory costs for researchers, including monitoring
costs, emerged as an issue in Canada and the USA. The
requirements set by RECs and other research regulators
could consume a large part of the budget. In Canada,
one interviewee considered high costs an unfair inhib-
ition on researchers with small budgets.
REC tasks
Patient protection
In all countries, the starting point for REC work was pa-
tient protection (safety), including voluntary participation
(patient autonomy) and data protection (confidentiality)
(Table 3). In the absence of specific criteria, the way in
which patient protection was measured and balanced with
other study aspects varied.
Research advancement
In Finland, the advancement of (good) research was a
concealed task (Table 3), although some REC commit-
tees or individual members were aware of it. The bene-
fits of research were usually narrowly defined in relation
to the participants in the project under review. In other
countries, particularly England, research advancement
was more explicitly acknowledged and the benefits for
future patients were considered.
Research prioritization
Was not considered a REC task in any of the countries
(Table 3). Neither were RECs interested in competition
Table 3 Tasks and items in clinical research projects covered by research ethics committees (RECs), Finland compared to England,
Canada (Ontario), and the USA, around 2010
Finland England Canada USA
Patient protection Starting point Starting point Starting point Starting point
Research advancement No Yes Yes Yesb
Research prioritization No No No No
Resourcea competition No No No No
Follow-up No Yes Yes Yes
Contract No No, another body No, another body No, another body
Items
Scientific quality Yes Evidence asked for Yes/ no Yes/Evidence asked for
Availability of results No Yes Yes Yesb
Research registration No Yes Yes (trials) Yes (trials)
Institutional liability No No Important Important
Following (legal) rules Important Not major issue Unknown Unknown
Conflicts of interest No Yes No, another body No, another body
aPatients, doctors and other resources for research.
bUnsure.
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for resources (availability of eligible patients and profes-
sionals) within an institute or population. This potentially
favoured sponsors who could offer better terms to the in-
stitute or health professionals conducting research.
Responsibility towards researchers
The consequences of REC work for researchers or re-
search funders, in terms of time or resources, were not a
REC consideration. An exception was drug trials in
Finland and England, for which the EU directive set time
limits on decision making (Table 2). Researchers and
sponsors had to pay the extra costs or delays resulting
from REC requirements. This was particularly problem-
atic in the case of academic funding, which could be
small with tight time limits.
Follow-up
Unlike the other countries, RECs in Finland were to re-
view the research plan but not follow the project
(Table 3). Researchers or sponsors could voluntarily send
amendments for review, which commercial sponsors
often did. The European clinical trials directive required
the follow-up of drug trials, but this was done by the
drug authority. In the other countries, RECs had to fol-
low the projects and annual reporting was customary.
Contracts
In Finland, RECs did not inspect contracts between
sponsors and institutions/researchers, other than the size
of intended payments to physicians (Table 3). Research
sites (e.g. hospitals) made contracts, giving no feedback
to RECs. The same occurred in England, where con-
tracts were made by healthcare trusts, with little cooper-
ation between RECs and trusts. In Canada and the USA,
contract offices acted separately from RECs, but in-
formed each other of their evaluations and decisions.
Specific items
Scientific quality
In all countries, the scientific quality of a project was
considered an ethical prerequisite: quality is important
in evaluating the risk-benefit ratio and poor quality re-
search needlessly puts patients at risk. The role of RECs
in this evaluation varied, and there could be parallel re-
views, including those of funders (Table 3). In Finland,
this evaluation was a REC task, whereas in England
RECs had clearly been deemed unsuitable for this role.
Instead, researchers or sponsors were asked to provide
evidence of scientific quality for REC consideration. In
Canada and the USA, reviewing scientific quality was
often a REC task. Sometimes, a tension existed between
established researchers and REC capabilities: established
researchers resented RECs’ involvement in methodo-
logical questions. In the USA, the drug control authority
thoroughly reviewed the scientific aspects of clinical tri-
als involving new drugs and devices or their new
indications.
Availability of results
In Finland, RECs did not cover the availability of results
(publication) (Table 3), even when it was clear that the
researchers had no control over publication. Registration
of trials or other research was not required. However,
many trials were registered in international registers due
either to anticipated publication requirements or the
trial being international. In England, the standard na-
tionwide REC application form asked for a publication
plan and trial registration. In Finland and England, drug
trial registration in an EU register was required by an
EU directive.
In Canada, checking on the availability and assumed
publication of results was part of REC work. At least in
the studied RECs, contract offices checked that no
clause prevented publication, which would be grounds
for rejecting the study. In the USA, registration of drug
and device trials was required by law and presenting the
outcomes in a public register had been proposed. For
other types of research, registration was voluntary.
Legality
This covers two related aspects: the role that RECs
had played (1) in ensuring that laws and other rules
were followed and (2) in protecting institutes and re-
searchers from liability (Table 3). In Finland, checking
that the project abided by laws and other rules was a
key task. RECs had a small role with regard to liabil-
ity. In England, a REC could define a project as ethic-
ally sound even when it broke a law or other rule.
However, permission would scarcely be forthcoming
from the institute for such a project.
In Canada, the Tri-Council statement offered ambiva-
lent advice on how RECs should take account of laws and
rules, but each REC was required to have a person familiar
with the relevant laws. In the RECs on which information
was available, the assessment of ethics and legality were
separated in the evaluation. Insurance companies’ require-
ments and other factors suggested that institutional liabil-
ity was a consideration. In the USA, although the REC
secretariat checked the legal requirements, RECs also de-
voted time to legal issues. RECs played a major role in
protecting institutions. If approval of a study later turned
out to be wrong, the entire institute’s research could be
endangered. Investment in RECs was a key risk avoidance
method within institutions.
Conflicts of interest (COI)
In Finland, COI between the researcher/institute and
sponsor were not part of ethical judgments (Table 3),
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and no other body oversaw COI. Since the late 2000s,
RECs had been advised to ask about payments to
physicians in order to assess the temptation to lock
patients into a research project, but no transparency
was required towards research participants. COI
within RECs were carefully observed, based on the le-
gislation on civil servants. In England COI checking
was an REC task, though no information was avail-
able on its thoroughness. In Canada and the USA,
COIs and their disclosers were important; special of-
fices or bodies took care of them and informed the
RECs of their conclusions. In Canada, patient leaflets
usually included a description of the financing source.
Quality assurance of REC work
REC control body oversight
In England and the USA, RECs were regulated and
supported by a REC control body (Table 4). In
Finland, one of the central REC’s (the National Committee
on Medical Research Ethics) tasks was to provide
local RECs with guidance and education and to give
second opinions in the case of complaints, but it had
no formal power over local RECs and had not taken
a leadership role.
In England, the NRES had been active in improving
REC work, reducing REC numbers, and streamlining
and standardizing procedures. It appointed, credited and
audited local RECs and educated their members. REC
secretariats were employees of the NRES. The NRES
audited RECs through visits, document checking, statis-
tical follow ups, and feedback from researchers. The
NRES did not review applications. In case of a com-
plaint, it referred the application to another local REC
for a second review.
In the USA, the Office of Human Research Protection
(OHRP) registered RECs and issued an “REC license” (a
federalwide assurance) by application. It could perform
or commission site visits to RECs or research sites. In
the case of (suspected) misconduct in a study, the OHRP
could overrule the REC decision and all approvals made
by the REC. Researchers could complain to the OHRP,
but the OHRP did not perform reviews itself. It was
more distant than the NRES, having no day to day inter-
action with local RECs. It had small resources in relation
to the number of RECs. The OHRP hosted a national
committee (Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human
Subjects Research), which provided expert advice and
recommendations on ethics and research regulation.
Formal quality assurance
Unlike the other countries, Finland had no formal qual-
ity assurance of RECs (Table 4). In England and the
USA, quality assurance was performed by the REC con-
trol bodies. In addition, the drug authorities could
Table 4 Features related to quality of research ethics committee (REC) work, Finland compared to England, Canada (Ontario), and
the USA, around 2010
Finland England Canada USA
REC control body oversight – Strong – Distant
Formal quality assurance No Control body Accreditation planned Control body, voluntary
accreditation
Inspection of RECs No Control body, rarely
by drug authority
Rarely by drug authority Control body and drug
authority
REC dismissal Not in practice Yes by central REC Not in practice In theory by central REC
Researchers’ choice of REC No Yes No Varieda
REC decision Statement Approval Approval Approval
Appeal possibilities Limited Yes, clear system Yes In theory
Independence from research site Semi-independent Yes No Varied
Accountable to Hospital districtb Control body Hospital boardc Institution/None
Transparency Low High Low, recognized Low
Obligatory education of members No Yes No No
Variability of decisions Not discussed Action taken Identified problem Identified problem
Dealing with exceptions
Informed consent exemptions in trials Not Yes Yes Yes
Emergency drug trials Not possible Possible Possible Possible
Handling of quality assurance research Ambiguity Problem identified Varied, problem identified Varied, problem identified
aNot in established academic research centres, elsewhere possible.
bSince 2010, before then accountability unclear.
cHospital boards consisting of outside members.
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inspect RECs that had handled drug or device trials. In
the USA, it could sanction and even disqualify RECs.
In the USA, voluntary accreditation of RECs, espe-
cially private ones, was common, performed by a pri-
vate company and costly. In Canada, there were plans
to establish an accreditation system, but by 2011 this
was not in place for human RECs. However, hospitals
were accredited, obliging them to demonstrate that
ethics were being attended to. Private RECs were un-
regulated. The Canadian General Standard Committee
(a federal agency) had begun introducing standards
for RECs dealing with drug and device trials. The
drug authority occasionally inspected RECs perform-
ing drug and trial reviews.
REC dismissal
In England, the NRES could suspend a REC (Table 4). In
the USA, the OHRP could temporarily stop the work of
a REC and in theory dismiss it. In Finland and Canada,
questions regarding dismissal were not specifically asked,
but there were no clear practices for this and, to the au-
thor’s knowledge, it had never occurred.
Researchers’ choice
In Finland, researchers could not choose the REC,
which was determined by the professional location of
the principal investigator (Table 4). In England, re-
searchers could choose a REC within the NHS, which
then had to handle the application, but the distance
travelled for presenting plans and waiting lists for
popular RECs regulated client numbers. Besides specific
groups defined by law, RECs did not handle research
outside the NHS. In Canada, research on patients cared
for in a health facility receiving government funding
had to be handled by the REC for that facility, unless
an agreement existed with a central committee. In the
USA, researchers in academic institutions had to use
the REC assigned by the institute. Researchers outside
academic institutes could choose the REC, but institu-
tional RECs seldom reviewed external research projects.
Researcher’s appeal possibilities
In Finland, a positive statement was made rather than a
decision (Table 4), although the statement was tanta-
mount to a decision in regard to obtaining research per-
mission. However, since this was not a decision in legal
terms, researchers could not complain, but could only
request the REC to consult the central REC for a second
opinion. There was no right to appeal in the case of pro-
jects handled by the central REC itself. Researchers
could re-submit to the same committee in the case of a
negative decision.
In England, in the case of rejection, the researcher
could discuss the issue with the REC, resubmit the
application to the same or another committee, or appeal
to the control body (NRES). In Canada, the researcher
could discuss the issue with the REC. If no agreement
was reached, the researcher could appeal to an institu-
tional appeal committee. In the USA, the author had the
impression that researchers or sponsors could negotiate
with RECs but did not often appeal, although appeals
could be made to the OHRP.
REC independence from research sites
In Finland, RECs were based in central hospitals. As
most clinical research occurred there, RECs were only
semi-independent from the research sites (Table 4).
After 2010, the number of RECs was reduced and more
projects were evaluated outside the responsible institu-
tion. In England, RECs were administratively independ-
ent from research sites. In Canada and the USA, RECs
were mostly within the institute. Private RECs were in-
dependent of research sites.
Accountability
In Finland, the nomination of REC members and the ac-
countability of RECs were unclear until 2010. Since then,
REC members had been appointed by university hospital
districts (Table 4). Although municipal administrators
appointed REC members, such members had “state civil
servant responsibility”. The central committee was
appointed by the health ministry. In England, RECs were
accountable to the control body (NRES). In Canada,
RECs were appointed by and reported to the hospital
board. In the USA, RECs were accountable to the hos-
pital/institution in which they were located. However,
REC operational procedures were specified when regis-
tering with the control body (OHRP). Private RECs were
accountable to themselves only, but their operational
procedures too were specified upon registration.
Transparency
In Finland, REC work was not transparent (Table 4).
Member selection was not an open process, there were
no public annual reports of REC work and the meeting
notes were available only upon request based on good
grounds (as judged by the REC itself ). The style of meet-
ing notes varied. Some even used codes for projects,
without mentioning the research objectives or topic and
using standard phrases when giving reasons for deci-
sions. Application documents were secret.
In England, transparency was an accepted policy and
REC positions were advertised. Much information on
RECs and their work, including most accepted study
protocols, were available from the NRES web pages. Fur-
ther openness was planned, including information on
rejected projects. In Canada, REC handling notes and
project protocols were kept secret. This had been
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identified as a transparency problem, but not solved by
2011. In the USA, REC meeting minutes were not public
in most states and there was no broad discussion on lack
of transparency. There was a proposal that access to re-
search protocols be required upon trial registration; this
had not occurred by 2011.
Obligatory education of REC members
In England, NRES provided obligatory introductory
training for new REC members and old members were
offered voluntary continuing training. In the other coun-
tries, REC members were not required training in ethics
or in work practices. In Canada and the USA, many self-
driven training options were available. In Canada, the
voluntary organization for REC members and staff
(CAREC) functioned as a clearing house, as well as a
training and networking organizer. In the USA, the prin-
cipal investigators were required to take ethics courses.
Variability in decisions
Variability in REC work and decisions was not dis-
cussed in Finland (Table 4). In England, this had been
an important argument for streamlining the ethics
system and creating the REC control body. In Canada
and the USA, the issue had been recognized as a
problem, but not solved. In Canada, in response, the
public funder had issued detailed criteria for use in
evaluations. In the USA, the problem had led to a
proposal to modify the Common Rule.
Dealing with exceptions
Informed consent exemption in trials In each country,
the main mechanism for assuring voluntary participation
was obtaining permission from participants fully in-
formed of the trial (informed consent). In certain re-
search designs, however, this did not work. In Finland,
exemptions from informed consent (waivers) were not
possible for medical intervention studies (Table 4); prac-
tices varied in the case of surveys and document-based
studies. Researchers solved the problem of lack of
exemptions by using apparent consent, changing the de-
sign, redefining the project as non-medical research or
development work, or dropping it. In the other coun-
tries, RECs could grant exemptions to informed consent.
In England, some interviewees stated that informed con-
sent had become less problematic.
Emergency drug trials
In Finland, the EU clinical trials directive had been inter-
preted as requiring informed consent from patients be-
fore recruitment for emergency drug trials (Table 4). In
England, although also an EU country, interpretation of
the directive had changed over time and emergency drug
trials were possible. This change was said to have been
facilitated by lobbying by emergency care physicians. In
Canada and the USA, exemptions to informed consent
were used in emergency trials.
Quality assurance research
Research evaluating how well healthcare services or pa-
tient care works or should work (quality improvement
research, quality assurance, audit, quality evaluation)
was problematic for RECs in all countries (Table 4). In
Finland, there had been no public discussion of the
issue. RECs emphasized separating research from care;
once the project had been defined as medical research,
no distinction was made in its handling. In England,
some advocated the exemption of quality assurance
studies from the ethics approval requirement. This was
part of a trend of focusing the NHS REC system on
clinical patient level research and leaving health services
and social sciences research outside their mandate. In
Canada and the USA, practices varied – some RECs
exempted such research, some had an expedited proced-
ure with simpler requirements, and some treated them as
normal research projects with full handling procedures.
Discussion
Study strengths and weaknesses
Most data from the four countries was collected by one
person with prior knowledge of the topic, enabling the
consistent external examination of each system [4]. This
also enabled information from one interview to be used
in the next.
Weaknesses included the difficulties inherent in any
country comparison, such as those resulting from
varying healthcare systems and the same tasks being
handled by different actors in different countries. Aspects
covered varied between interviews. Due to limited re-
sources, it was not possible to approach informants again
to enquire about issues which had arisen after their inter-
views. The findings presented are simplifications and do
not describe the many exceptions and nuances. Data con-
fidentiality, data access, secrecy, and privacy issues were
not systematically studied, although these are topical in re-
search ethics.
Similar previous comparative studies were not found
in order to compare the results. This may be due to the
fact that this study was the first of its kind, or that previ-
ous studies have appeared in forms difficult to trace via
literature searches. Previous literature was unsystematic-
ally searched from medical databases using various key-
words and from the reference lists of related articles.
Comments on results
In Finland, RECs were regulated by a detailed medical
research law and in case of drug trials, as in England, by
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a detailed EU law (directive). Detailed legislation can
lead to conflicts between laws and ethics [2]: an im-
portant ethical question concerns the amount of dis-
cretion left to researchers. A check-box mentality may
make them feel that they have lost responsibility for
their own work. There is no one way of performing
clinical research ethically; overly detailed advice will
harm both research and ethics [17].
Furthermore, laws make the ethics system rigid, par-
ticularly supra-national laws. They are more difficult to
change than rules in response to regulatory problems or
changes in research. Broad-based legislation and detailed
rules at lower level, as in the USA, may be a good com-
promise, allowing a more responsive system. Another
legal issue concerns how much consideration RECs
should give to the consequences of their decisions. In
Finland, little consideration was given to this, but it was
a very prominent issue in the USA: RECs have func-
tioned as legal insurance for hospitals in regard to
research.
In Finland, a key issue was that regulation was legally
required for “medical” research only. This distinction
from the rest of “health” research or other human re-
search was largely artificial. In the other countries, the
definitional problems were smaller, being more related
to the location of the research. None of the countries
had resolved how to distinguish research from other
activities; the boundaries with research and public health
interventions or quality assurance programs were un-
clear. Such problems are likely to become more promin-
ent alongside new trends in evidence-based healthcare
[2]. Such distinctions were especially difficult in Finland,
whose research legislation did not allow exemptions to
informed consent. Healthcare ethics should be consid-
ered as a whole rather than divided between research
and healthcare practice [18,19].
In all countries, drug trials were subject to special
regulation and additional reviews by drug control au-
thorities. The special regulation system for drug trials
could be questioned, but this had not been done. The
2001 EU clinical trials directive on drug research was
very detailed. In 2017, it will be replaced by a new re-
vised EU-regulation (No 536/2014 on clinical trials on
medicinal products for human use), equally detailed, but
improved in some respects. In the USA, drug trials
aiming at drug licensing had their own regulation
path, since most were handled in private RECs, with
the drug authority (FDA) playing a key role. Further-
more, in the two EU countries studied, Finland and
England, the directive changed some features of
the overall research regulation system and rules. In
general, the EU directive had been important in the
creation and formulation of RECs in many European
Union countries [1,7].
Regulation costs for researchers and institutions
have been discussed in the USA [12,18]. Studies show
that RECs imposed notable costs on host institutions
[18,20,21]. However, the current study suggests that
institutions did not consider REC costs too high, as
RECs were an important part of risk management. In
addition, there were costs for other actors, particu-
larly researchers and sponsors.
It is not clear what constitutes the ethics to be guaran-
teed by RECs [6,22-24]. In addition to patient protection,
the RECs in the four countries studied had other criteria
of varying importance. One of them, scientific quality,
can be problematic, as REC members are chosen to re-
view participant protection and may not be the best per-
sons to evaluate scientific quality, particularly that of
studies using novel approaches. The English approach,
requesting evidence of scientific value for the REC’s con-
sideration, was a good compromise.
A lack of ethics criteria also meant that research
motives were not considered. Availability of results is
an ethical issue because, if the results are not publicly
available, altruistic participation or the use of publicly
collected information become private property.
Studies suggest that many academic researchers
(i.e. those not working for commercial sponsors)
were unhappy with RECs. Some have complained
that RECs impede their research work rather than
ensuring ethical conduct [25-31]. In this study, the
quality of REC work was not directly measured, but
structures or procedures for ensuring quality were
studied. Finland had the least and England the most
such structures. In England, researchers’ ability to
choose their REC was a key issue. As RECs were not
paid for their work, there was no incentive to “sell
permissions”, which was also likely to be prevented
by the close surveillance of the REC control body. In
the USA “selling permissions” was a clear danger in
the case of private RECs. Other important elements
of quality assurance were transparency and appeal
possibilities; these too were best organized in England.
However, some appeal possibilities may be notional
only, due to researchers’ fear of the negative conse-
quences of appeals. Fearing the possible conse-
quences, researchers seldom wish to protest openly or
challenge RECs. In the case of drug trials, researchers
may be afraid to challenge the control authorities for
fear of repercussions when applying for a product license
or another trial.
The general aim of RECs, to help preserve research
ethics, is rarely questioned, but various aspects of REC
activities have been widely criticized [16,24,26,32-38].
In all countries, a great deal of time was used by RECs
and other actors to check various procedural formal-
ities. Such efforts are unlikely to have made research
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more ethical. They may serve other purposes, but these
were not clearly spelled out. Multi-location projects
were increasingly common, but the REC system had
been created at a time when they were less so.
This study provides no direct answers to the obvious
question – why had the various identified problems not
been solved. Power relations may be important: who gets
to define what is right and wrong [39] and what should
be done and by whom? RECs are a channel through
which outsiders can participate in decision making in a
research project. Furthermore, much clinical research is
supported by influential technology players such as
multinational drug firms, which may be influencing the
content of ethics and administrative rules to protect
them from competitors and academic investigators, and
may also want uniform regulations and requirements for
large markets. Those responsible for REC work may feel
the need to resist commercial pressures and create vari-
ous rules to assist in this.
Conclusions
This study lends support to the criticism that RECs
may prevent research: the rules and procedures are
many and costly, and likely to deter individual clini-
cians [40]. General observations suggest that RECs
have improved the rights of people participating in
research, but the balance struck between the rights of
people and patients in general is questionable if rele-
vant research has been prevented or the relevance of
research design and content compromised. The rules
and practices of RECs should be improved.
Certain features of REC work in individual countries
could serve as a model for others. Streamlining of the
ethics committee system in England, content advice on
the handling of ethical issues in Canada, and the separ-
ation of drug trials for licensing from other drug re-
search in the USA, are examples. In regard to structure,
some Finnish features, such as area responsibility, lack
of private RECs, and the relative lightness of REC work,
were good [41].
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